Understanding how consumers react to what is happening as a crisis evolves is crucial for those charged with risk management and risk communication. Responsibility, blame and accountability are important concepts in any crisis, particularly when consumer confidence has been damaged. In this article we examine to what extent, and to what effect, responsibility, blame and accountability figure in consumer reactions in the immediate aftermath of a food crisis. The data we draw on in this article is derived from an online engagement study which took place in 'real time' as the crisis unfolded. Through this study we were able to explore how consumers responded to the adulteration of processed beef products with horsemeat in early 2013 in Ireland and the UK. We found that consumers attributed causal responsibility and allocated blame for the adulteration to three factors, the deliberately deceitful practices of the food industry, the complexity of the food supply chain, and demand from (other) consumers for cheap food. We found that consumers were willing to begin the process of rebuilding their confidence in the food system and accountability was viewed as the primary means for restoring confidence.
Individuals attribute causal responsibility to actors or objects when they identify them 35 as contributing to the occurrence of the event (Bickerstaff et al., 2006) . It is possible to identify 36 various ways in which consumers can attribute a causal role to individuals and organisations 37 during a food crisis. Consumers can hold certain individuals or organisations causally 38 responsible for an event or see them as causally contributing to the event by the actions they 39 take or fail to take (Schafer, 1999) . Consumers can see these individuals or organisations as 40 'complicit'; as Busby argues not as primary agents but as contributors:
the involvement that various groups have in the generation of a risk, not as primary 43 agents, nor as the notional risk managers, but as people whose action in some way 44 contributes to the risk" (Busby, 2008 (Busby, , p. 1571 ).
Thus consumers may look beyond those directly responsible for an event attributing 47 responsibility more widely across a range of individuals and organisations. blame as a moral judgement is an understanding that risk is 'man-made'. Green (1999) argues 58 that society increasingly views accidents and disasters as preventable events rather than 59 unpredictable and random, thus, when a disaster or risk does arise, then someone must be to 60 blame and held accountable. Douglas in her seminal study of cultural theory (1992), also 61 highlighted the centrality of a 'new blaming system' in society: when a disaster occurs, 62 individuals or groups will respond by allocating blame in such a manner to protect their own 63 worldview. There may be a tendency to assume that in times of a crisis, considerations of 64 responsibility will always result in negative attributions. However, a broader view of moral 65 responsibility posits that an actor judged to be morally responsible for an event with desirable 66 or positive outcomes will garner gratitude, respect and praise (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000) .
67
A food scare can be seen as a 'fateful moment', one which challenges taken for granted 68 assumptions that food is safe and stimulates reflection on every-day activities such as eating 69 practices based on habit (Eden, Bear, & Walker, 2008 
153
We started the study soon after the start of the horsemeat incident, when consumers 154 were being exposed to information from sources that were attempting to explain the incident.
155
We wanted to capture the consumers' process of sense-making by creating a platform mirroring We chose content testers to represent a variety of authentic and significant 178 communications related to the horsemeat incident circulating in the public domain at the time.
179
We decided on the content testers in consultation with the whole research team who are all 180 authors of this article. We chose content testers to reflect the main themes being communicated focus groups frame the responses in line with social norms and group dynamics), we 187 acknowledge that there is more explicit framing in the current study with the use of stimuli 188 such as the content testers but we view this as a parameter of the current study, rather than a 189 limitation.
190
We employed multiple content testers (using multiple formats), which presented a To ensure timely recruitment of participants, we used an international recruitment agency 226 which specialised in online research (Toluna). Participants were recruited from their national 227 online panels of participants, who had never before been involved in a VIZZATA™ study. Table 1 . It is 234 possible that the views of some social groups are under-represented in the current study; for 235 example, we do not have information on the socio-economic background of our participants.
236
As this is a qualitative investigation, we did not seek to obtain a representative sample of the Participants also criticised the quality control systems and monitoring processes of the 368 authorities and regulatory bodies which had failed to identify the adulteration. Participants 369 argued that the regulatory agencies and their staff were put in place to detect and prevent 370 fraudulent activity but were obviously not fit for purpose:
371
The department have vets and checks in place in factories. Why did they not 372 find out the make-up of the imported product before it hit the food chain.
373
(Ireland, Female, 51+)
374
In considering the complexity of the food system, participants reflected on the wider political, 375 social, and economic processes which had facilitated the food industry's adulteration activities. The need for accountability 421 The participants in our study stated that those in the food system (including the food producers, 
Restoration of confidence

459
For many participants, the confidence they had previously had in the processed meat sector had 460 been undermined. Most participants expressed a strong sense of disgust, moral outrage, and 461 betrayal at the thought that horse meat (traditionally not a food animal in these cultures) had 462 entered the food chain. Indeed all the participants accepted that this adulteration was a 'crisis' or 'scandal' even though three was no direct threat to public health. Participants felt they had 464 the right to expect and be confident that a purchased food product lived up to their expectations 465 of quality and safety:
466
If these products were labelled "Horse meat burgers" that would be fine but as 467 they are 'Beefburgers' we have the right to expect that they are made from beef.
468
(UK, Male, 51+)
469
The horsemeat incident forced participants to reconsider and reflect on their confidence in the 
538
However it is important to note that some participants felt that some consumers should 539 bear some responsibility for the adulteration, because they wanted 'cheap' produce. This 
562
Accountability within the food processing sector is vital as it allows consumers place 563 confidence in a system that is otherwise opaque to them.
564
The participants in our study wanted to ensure that accountability was enforced through 
Conclusion
623
In this article we have examined how participants in our research study constructed and used 
